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PulseNet International is a global network dedicated 
to laboratory-based surveillance for food-borne 
diseases. The network comprises the national and 
regional laboratory networks of Africa, Asia Pacific, 
Canada, Europe, Latin America and the Caribbean, 
the Middle East, and the United States. The PulseNet 
International vision is the standardised use of whole 
genome sequencing (WGS) to identify and subtype 
food-borne bacterial pathogens worldwide, replacing 
traditional methods to strengthen preparedness and 
response, reduce global social and economic disease 
burden, and save lives. To meet the needs of real-time 
surveillance, the PulseNet International network will 
standardise subtyping via WGS using whole genome 
multilocus sequence typing (wgMLST), which deliv-
ers sufficiently high resolution and epidemiological 
concordance, plus unambiguous nomenclature for the 
purposes of surveillance. Standardised protocols, vali-
dation studies, quality control programmes, database 
and nomenclature development, and training should 
support the implementation and decentralisation of 
WGS. Ideally, WGS data collected for surveillance 
purposes should be publicly available, in real time 
where possible, respecting data protection policies. 
WGS data are suitable for surveillance and outbreak 
purposes and for answering scientific questions per-
taining to source attribution, antimicrobial resistance, 
transmission patterns, and virulence, which will fur-
ther enable the protection and improvement of public 
health with respect to food-borne disease.
Introduction
Almost one in 10 people in the world become ill every 
year due to consumption of contaminated food; diar-
rhoeal diseases are the most common cause of illness, 
with 550 million cases and 230,000 deaths every year 
[1]. Children under five years of age bear 40% of this 
burden along with potentially life-long sequelae [1]. 
Campylobacter jejuni/coli and Salmonella enterica are 
the most common causes of bacterial diarrhoea glob-
ally and are responsible for ca 96 and 80 million infec-
tions every year, respectively [1].
PulseNet International is a global laboratory network 
dedicated to bacterial food-borne disease surveillance, 
comprised of the national, regional and subregional 
laboratory networks of Africa, Asia Pacific, Canada, 
Europe, Latin America and the Caribbean, the Middle 
East, and the United States (US); 86 countries in total 
(Figure 1) [2].
The mission of PulseNet International is to implement 
standardised genotyping methods and share informa-
tion in real-time within regional and national labora-
tory networks to support surveillance and outbreak 
response enabling the direct comparison of inter-labo-
ratory data irrespective of geography.
The primary method of molecular subtyping used by 
PulseNet International for the identification and inves-
tigation of outbreaks has been pulsed-field gel elec-
trophoresis (PFGE), with multilocus variable-number 
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tandem repeat analysis (MLVA) applied to selected 
organisms [3]. The use of standardised, validated pro-
tocols and analysis procedures by all participants cou-
pled with consistent interpretive criteria has enabled 
countless successful outbreak investigations, both 
within single countries and also spanning across bor-
ders [4]. Current PulseNet methods, PFGE and MLVA, 
are no longer considered cutting edge but have been 
extremely efficient in driving the detection, investiga-
tion and control of food-borne infection outbreaks in 
the past 20 years due to the demonstration of high 
typeability, reproducibility, discriminatory power, and 
good epidemiological concordance [5]. For timely and 
effective surveillance and outbreak response, data 
must remain comparable at all times among laborato-
ries; any modifications on existing methods or intro-
duction of new methods must be carefully validated 
and implemented by all network members in order to be 
effective and to avoid disrupting the surveillance due 
to backwards incompatibility issues [3,6]. Although 
new methods are often tested within the network they 
rarely make it into routine surveillance for this reason. 
Whole genome sequencing (WGS) has benefits that 
outweigh the challenges of disrupting the surveillance 
within the network.
WGS has shown superior sensitivity, specificity and 
more timely resolution to outbreak clustering com-
pared with traditional methods [7-14]. Examples of 
the ability of WGS to facilitate emergency response 
are also demonstrated by International Food Safety 
Authorities Network (INFOSAN) emergency alerts; at 
least thirteen of the 48 biological events reported in 
2014 and 2015 were supported with WGS [15]. Other 
strengths of WGS are its applicability to all organisms 
and its potential to provide multiple tests in silico from 
a single assay. These include subtyping tests, inferring 
biological properties (e.g. virulence genes, antibiotic 
resistance), and other phenotype predictions such as 
serotype. Moreover, genome sequencing elucidates 
the actual phylogenetic relationship among isolates. 
This renders the data useful for answering broader 
questions outside the relatively narrow scope of out-
break detection and response. For example, the same 
data used for routine surveillance could also be used 
for precise microbiological attribution studies, to elu-
cidate transmission pathways and common properties 
of persistent strains, and to identify potential interven-
tion points along the food safety continuum.
The vision of PulseNet International is for WGS to be 
used in all public health laboratories to identify, char-
acterise and subtype food-borne pathogens, largely 
Figure 1
Map of PulseNet International participating countries, May 2017
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replacing existing phenotypic and molecular methods 
in support of preparedness and response to food-
borne illness at the local, national, regional and global 
levels. This paper provides considerations of the criti-
cal technical and practical aspects of WGS from the 
perspective of standardised international laboratory-
based surveillance and the prerequisites for routine 
implementation in public health.
Whole genome sequence generation
Preparation and sequencing
There are several technologies available for genome 
sequencing. Collectively known as massively paral-
lel sequencing, they produce billions of nt sequences 
during each run, where each genome is sequenced 
multiple times in small random pieces (reads and con-
tigs) to generate very large datasets [16]. Even though 
sequencing platforms (e.g. Illumina, etc.) have differ-
ent biochemistry and arrays, the workflow is similar: 
(i) DNA extraction; (ii) library preparation, which usu-
ally includes shearing the DNA either mechanically or 
enzymatically, adding adaptors and barcodes/indexes, 
and amplification; (iii) template preparation, either by 
bridge amplification or emulsion PCR; and (iv) sequenc-
ing (the sequencing run itself is highly automated). 
Data processing
Processing data from WGS, regardless of the platform 
used, follows the same general workflow. Fragments 
or ‘reads’ (FASTQ format) from sequencing runs are 
trimmed to remove adaptor and barcode sequences 
(added during library generation), and low-quality 
reads. Depending on the analysis method chosen, 
the reads may or may not need to be assembled. 
Assembling is the process of placing all of the reads 
together in the correct order to create a small number 
of contiguous sequences, known as contigs (FASTA 
format). This can be done using a known reference 
sequence (closed genome) to guide the assembly, or 
it can be done de novo (draft genome), i.e. without 
prior knowledge of the expected order. Especially the 
latter is computationally relatively demanding for the 
four main species involved in food-borne diseases: 
Salmonella spp, Campylobacter spp, Listeria monocy-
togenes and Shiga toxin-producing Escherichia coli [17]. 
With current technologies, due to the short length of 
the individual reads compared with repetitive regions, 
a genome for these species is also rarely fully assem-
bled (closed genome).
Analysis methods
K-mer, SNP, and gene-by-gene methods for in 
silico subtyping
There are many ways to analyse whole genome 
sequence data, including methods that will replace tra-
ditional molecular subtyping methods. Three common 
approaches for this are k-mers, single nucleotide poly-
morphisms (SNP), and the gene-by-gene based – i.e. 
extended multilocus sequence typing (MLST) based on 
WGS – approach. These methods have good epidemio-
logical concordance, but differ in other features such as 
amenability to standardisation, stable nomenclature, 
scalability, the need for reference strains or assem-
blies, and computing and bioinformatics resource 
requirements (Table 1).
Briefly, k-mers have lower discriminatory capacity than 
the two other methods and are mainly useful for crude 
and rapid initial sequence comparison of isolates where 
maximum resolution is not needed and as a tool for 
detection of species [18]. The SNP approach is highly 
discriminatory but sensitive to the selection of the ref-
erence the SNPs are called against; this means that if 
two laboratories use a different reference for their SNP 
calling of the same outbreak the SNP differences of iso-
lates not included in the analysis in both laboratories 
cannot be directly compared [18]. SNP analysis is com-
putationally intensive and might therefore be rather 
slow; access to high performance computing is man-
datory for analysing large sequence sets. Additionally, 
many SNP pipelines are currently command-line based, 
requiring substantial bioinformatics knowledge by the 
end-user. This is likely to change as the field progresses 
and pipelines continue to evolve to more user-friendly, 
Table 1
Key features of k-mer, single nucleotide polymorphism (SNP) and multilocus sequence typing (MLST) approaches relevant 
to laboratories providing routine public health functions
Features K-mer SNP MLST
Epidemiological concordance Intermediate High High
Discrimination Intermediate High High
Stable strain nomenclature No No Yes
International standardisation No No Yes
Scalability No No Yes
Speed Intermediate Slow SNP calling, slow comparisons Slow allele calling, fast comparisons
Local computing requirements Low High Low
Local bioinformatics expertise required Yes Yes No
Curation of database No No Yes
SNP: single nucleotide polymorphisms; MLST: extended multilocus sequence typing.
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‘plug and play’ formats. The method chosen for stand-
ardised surveillance by PulseNet International is the 
gene-by-gene approach. 
Whole genome MLST, the method chosen by 
PulseNet International 
For integration into routine public health surveillance 
and for maintaining inter-laboratory comparability, the 
gene-by-gene, i.e. extended MLST, approach offers a 
number of compelling features. The extended MLST 
schemes assess information from coding regions only, 
and collapse different types of mutations into a single 
allelic change. Allele information is assessed by com-
paring new sequences with an allele database that 
contains all genes (‘loci’) present in the typical several 
hundred strains used to create the scheme. The num-
ber of genes assessed may range from typically seven 
housekeeping genes to a several thousand [19]. The 
biggest schemes contain the genes in the core genome 
(genes present in nearly all strains of the same spe-
cies, core genome (cg)MLST), or the whole or pan 
genome (all core genes plus accessory genes present 
in any strain used to create the allele database, whole 
genome (wg)MLST). Custom sets of any number of 
genes may also be analysed. Constructing and validat-
ing a reliable cg- or wgMLST scheme that is also acces-
sible to all and simple to run is a significant undertaking 
but once implemented such schemes could be easy to 
work with by the end-users (microbiologists and epi-
demiologists). Nevertheless, the output from wgMLST 
analyses may also need consultation with experts to 
ensure proper interpretation. The allele calling process 
can be automated but is fairly slow; once alleles are 
called the analytical process is fast. In contrast to SNP 
analysis, wgMLST comparisons are much faster and 
may run on ordinary desktop computers, as an allelic 
profile is simply a string of integers.
Extended MLST schemes are phylogenetically relevant 
and at least in their most extensive form, wgMLST, they 
appear to be as discriminatory as SNP comparisons 
for Salmonella and Listeria, and provide significantly 
improved resolution and epidemiological concordance 
compared with molecular methods (data not shown).
Backwards compatibility of WGS with the existing 
gold standard methods PFGE and MLVA is very lim-
ited, regardless of the WGS analysis method. The short 
reads are not amenable to a complete assembly, which 
would be required to predict a PFGE restriction pattern, 
and in particular do not assemble the repetitive regions 
assessed by MLVA correctly. To mitigate the effects of 
losing comparability, some laboratories are choosing 
to perform both molecular and WGS-based subtyping 
in parallel for a period of time. The seven-gene MLST 
pattern can readily be extracted from WGS data.
The technical performance of wgMLST along with its 
scalability and amenability to standardisation and 
stable nomenclature (see section below) plus the com-
putational and bioinformatics prerequisites realistic 
for many public health laboratories position wgMLST 
as the method of choice at this time for PulseNet 
International.
Implications for information technology 
(IT) infrastructure and bioinformatics 
expertise
WGS presents a number of challenges to the IT infra-
structure of most PulseNet laboratories, which often 
operate in tightly regulated Windows-operating sys-
tem-based computing environments and of which some 
may not always have stable power supply or Internet 
connections. Key issues for implementing WGS are 
bioinformatics expertise and software, and especially 
for larger laboratories storage space and computing 
power.
Storage space
Each sequencing run generates gigabytes (GB) of data, 
with sequence read sets (SRS) of 100–500 megabyte 
(MB) in size for each isolate. Many laboratories antici-
pate analysing thousands of isolates each year, and 
storage on existing systems will likely be prohibitively 
expensive. Generally speaking, it is desirable to retain 
the SRSs (and not just the final processed data assem-
bled) so that they may be used for future analyses by 
using alternative methods such as SNPs or assess-
ment of mobile genetic elements e.g. from phages. 
Some PulseNet International members currently store 
the SRSs within their own reference laboratory’s data 
storage. Some also submit them in close to real-time to 
one of the databases of the International Nt Sequence 
Database Collaboration (INSDC, http://www.insdc.
org), such as the Sequence Read Archive (SRA) at the 
National Center for Biotechnology Information and the 
European Nt Archive at the European Molecular Biology 
Laboratory, as well as the DNA Databank of Japan 
Sequence Read Archive (DRA). Using a public domain 
archive removes the storage cost from individual labo-
ratories and makes the data available to the wider sci-
entific community in perpetuity, but also necessitates 
public data sharing. This is problematic for some coun-
tries with respect to data protection (see section on 
data sharing below). Additionally, it is expected that 
very few countries in the future will have the capac-
ity to store the ever growing amount of raw sequence 
data in-house. Strategies to manage the information 
associated with each isolate (i.e. the descriptive data, 
sometimes referred to as meta-data) are being devel-
oped and implemented by some PulseNet International 
network laboratories (see data sharing section below). 
Another potential storage solution consists of commer-
cial clouds (e.g. BaseSpace, Amazon S3), with users 
paying per GB of storage; storage costs using these 
options are typically lower than in-house solutions; 
however, many organisations prohibit the use of com-
mercial clouds due to institutional data security poli-
cies. Additionally, if an outside-house storage solution 
is pursued, Internet connections with adequate band-
width must be available. Given the great diversity in 
resources across PulseNet International laboratories, 
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a one-size-fits-all solution might not be possible but 
renders publicly available storage options compelling.
Computing power, bioinformatics expertise, 
and software
Laboratories have three options for bioinformatics 
tools: in-house pipelines, web and/or cloud-based 
tools, and outsourcing; each has pros and cons. Many 
in-house bioinformatics pipelines utilise Linux-based 
tools, which while powerful, cannot be easily run on 
Windows- operating system-based computers and are 
frequently not supported by institutions’ information 
technology (IT) departments. 
Cloud-based and publicly available computing and bio-
informatics may provide a solution for analysis (e.g. 
the Center for Genomic Epidemiology, http://www.
genomicepidemiology.org/). However, public health 
laboratories operate under strict quality assurance and 
accreditation requirements, necessitating guaranteed 
access to computing and bioinformatics tools. Within 
a single country or region, cloud-based bioinformatics 
tools can be maintained by local specialists, be parti-
tioned from secure corporate or in-house computing 
networks as needed, and in many cases be scaled to 
meet demand (Figure 2). For PulseNet International 
laboratories with modest numbers of isolates, making 
use of cloud-based or other web-based public analysis 
tools may facilitate entry into WGS (as could outsourc-
ing the actual sequencing instead of purchasing the 
equipment). The actual analysis tools can be used from 
open sources or commercial software.
Additionally, outsourcing analyses to a third party is 
an alternative, e.g. a PulseNet regional coordinator 
may serve as a third party analyst as it was done in 
PulseNet Latin America and the Caribbean for the anal-
ysis of PFGE data while waiting for individual partici-
pants to acquire the analytical software [2,20]. 
Due to the nature of public health and regulatory 
decision making action in food safety, robustness is 
essential as subtyping results often provide the critical 
evidence during food recalls, outbreak investigations, 
and prosecutions; they must be defendable in a court 
of law. For this reason, the ability to track the versions 
of software tools and parameters is a basic require-
ment, i.e. the ability to precisely recreate analyses from 
Figure 2
Potential solutions for computing and storage in PulseNet International laboratories, May 2017
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This workflow separates storage of the sequence data, from the intensive bioinformatics analyses that need to be performed on them, in 
particular genome assembly and allele calling. This allows performing these analyses on a dedicated computing cluster either in-house 
or in the cloud, where they can be maintained and updated by bioinformatics experts who may not reside within the same organisation or 
even country as the PulseNet laboratory. No confidential information is handled on this computing cluster. Within the PulseNet laboratory, 
microorganism experts will perform quality controls, cluster analysis on MLST data, as well as evaluating virulence and other factors. 
Following data interpretation, laboratory experts will use this information for outbreak investigations, reporting and sharing with other 
agencies. When required, SNP analysis will be performed on subsets of closely related strains.
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the past and arrive at the same results is a necessity. 
Presently, many PulseNet International laboratories do 
not have ready access to bioinformatics expertise. In 
deciding to use open source or commercial software, 
issues to consider include the need and ability to mod-
ify and tailor the source code, the ability of the non-
bioinformatician PulseNet participants to learn and use 
the tools, the process for and cost of maintenance and 
updates, version control and other quality measures, 
and the cost of licenses and bioinformatics personnel. 
The ability to store and analyse associated descriptive 
and other laboratory data alongside the sequence data 
also needs to be considered.
Nomenclature
Despite achieving success in standardising molecular 
subtyping and inter-laboratory comparability across 
86 countries, PulseNet International has not been 
able to implement global PFGE nomenclature for food-
borne pathogens, largely due to the complexities (and 
costs) of implementing a central, global PFGE data-
base requiring frequent manual curation. To date, each 
country or region maintains their own PFGE databases 
and nomenclature, with the exchange of data files to 
compare results across disparate nomenclatures as 
needed. In addition to its superior performance, WGS 
provides at long last the opportunity for a truly global 
nomenclature, facilitating laboratory-based surveil-
lance at the international level and opening the door to 
future reductions in the burden of food-borne disease. 
Gene-by-gene-based approaches to WGS-based sub-
typing are highly suitable to stable nomenclature and, 
with international agreement to use the same scheme, 
provide a natural choice for worldwide implementation 
via PulseNet (see previous section). A detailed consid-
eration of nomenclature is provided by the European 
food- and waterborne disease (FWD)-NEXT Expert 
Group [21].
Allele nomenclature
Allele nomenclature provides the names and defini-
tions of all loci included in the wg/cgMLST scheme, as 
well as correspondence between allele sequences and 
allele identifiers (Figure 3).
 
The latter consists of unique identifiers, integers, 
that each correspond to a particular allele sequence 
for a pre-defined locus on the genome, and which do 
not change over time. Assignment of allele identifiers 
converts the WGS data for an isolate into a series of 
identifiers, one per locus. The resulting allelic profiles 
are used to determine genetic similarity between iso-
lates. For PulseNet International laboratories to main-
tain real-time outbreak detection and inter-laboratory 
comparability, it is crucial that allele calling can be 
done reliably in real-time; i.e. automated, and that the 
nomenclature scheme used is the same in all laborato-
ries. This will ultimately require a global allele-calling 
algorithm, which is still in the early stages. Issues to 
be addressed are the use of sequence reads vs assem-
blies, assembly method, locus start and end defini-
tions, parameters for locus identification and allele 
sequence extraction, algorithm accuracy per locus, 
etc.; the amount of manual curation may initially be 
high but ultimately the actual allele calling will be fully 
automatic. The wg/cgMLST approach will also necessi-
tate an international database of alleles; there are sev-
eral features of such a database that would be highly 
beneficial to international public health users (Table 2).
Organisations producing WGS data have differing poli-
cies on data sharing, so a global allele nomenclature 
database that strives to meet the needs of most is 
optimal. For example, it must be possible to submit 
not only whole genomes as raw reads or assembly, but 
also individual new alleles detected through the use of 
a local cached allele nomenclature database. In case 
of full genomes, it must be possible to have them auto-
matically deleted once alleles have been called unless 
the submitter wants the full sequence to become avail-
able to the general public and/or the allele database 
curators. Because of the substantial size of raw read 
data, an allele calling platform would also need suffi-
cient bandwidth to support such large amounts of data 
being continuously uploaded by organisations world-
wide, along with computational resources available to 
process alleles and return results in real-time. A flexible 
system that has an open interface would facilitate inte-
gration with existing organisations’ or other third party 
systems. Quality control must be carefully planned as 
part of allele calling, as poor quality or dubious alleles, 
or alleles that match several paralogous genes, should 
not be used as reference alleles due to the reduction 
in reproducibility and deterioration of quality. For all 
Figure 3
Allele and strain nomenclature
ALLELE NOMENCLATURE
• Schemes (locus sets):  core genome, seven-gene,…
•  Unique code for each type of genome: 
    sequence type, clonal complex,  cluster type,…
•  Strain classification algorithm to determine 
     type based on allele identifiers.
• Locus names and definitions, ideally for the entire 
    known pan genome.
•  Unique identifier for each allele sequence.
•  Allele-calling algorithm to extract allele sequences 
    from a new sequence for all defined loci, and 
    matches against known allele sequence.
STRAIN NOMENCLATURE
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submissions, the provision to the user of an automated 
quality assessment is essential. The selection of addi-
tional reference alleles will require manual interven-
tion by curators, but this is expected to be infrequent. 
New loci should not routinely be added to an existing 
wgMLST scheme since this invariably will also require 
revision of the strain nomenclature database (see next 
section). Security features would mitigate inadvertent 
or malicious use (e.g. submissions of large amounts 
of artificial sequences) while ensuring that individual 
allele sequences and their identifiers remain publicly 
accessible – perhaps by requiring user registration for 
submissions. Finally, a process to solicit input from 
stakeholders and the development of a collaboration 
agreement or terms of service would facilitate use 
by many public health organisations. Until the global 
allele nomenclature database has been established, 
PulseNet International members have informally 
agreed to work with local or regional versions of the 
same extended MLST scheme and use internally the 
same allele calling method for each pathogen.
Strain nomenclature
Strain nomenclature is a construct devised to classify 
and accordingly label an isolate, placing it into a des-
ignated category within the diversity of the species. It 
is essential in food-borne disease outbreak investiga-
tions for simplified and rapid communication among 
stakeholders. These include epidemiologists, medical 
and food safety officers, inspectors, and healthcare 
and environmental health professionals, wherein rapid 
and effective communication is best achieved through 
simple tables, line lists, outbreak reports, and person-
to-person conversations, without the need to explain 
the topology of a phylogenetic tree. A strain nomencla-
ture derived from allele identifiers but also reflecting 
phylogeny (and epidemiologically relevant) would be 
ideal. Such nomenclatures are hierarchical when they 
consist of codes that contain several levels of similar-
ity [21,22]. When two isolates share only part of the 
code – e.g. ‘1.2.3’ vs ‘1.2.4’ – they are similar to some 
extent since they are both classified as ‘1.2’ and more 
similar than isolates that differ in the second digit, e.g. 
‘1.2.3’ vs ‘1.4.9’, which in turn are more similar than 
isolates that do not have the first digit in common, 
e.g. ‘1.2.3’ vs ‘2.1.4’. The definition of a species’ core 
genome, i.e. the loci common to nearly all isolates of a 
particular species (or lineage) is critical for the devel-
opment of strain nomenclature. For some pathogens, 
whole genome or pangenome, i.e. all loci detected in 
any isolate of a species, may also be used for strain 
nomenclature. Core genomes have been suggested for 
L. monocytogenes, C. jejuni/coli, S. enterica, and E. coli 
(http://bigsdb.pasteur.fr/listeria/listeria.html; http://
pubmlst.org/campylobacter; https://enterobase.war-
wick.ac.uk) [23,24]. The stability and accuracy of tax-
onomical nomenclature is not yet well established, 
although they are expected to be suitable for surveil-
lance purposes. For those pathogens for which a hier-
archical nomenclature may not be possible, categorical 
nomenclatures akin to the sequence types and clonal 
complexes for seven-gene MLST can always be derived. 
The algorithm for strain classification should ideally be 
stable, i.e. reproducibly return the same code for the 
same isolate on repeated testing. As is the case for the 
allele nomenclature database, an open interface for 
machine-to-machine communication and authentica-
tion of users should also be in place. It has much lower 
infrastructure requirements than allele nomenclature 
since only allele identifiers need to be submitted. 
Global strain nomenclature schemes should ideally be 
curated by the subject-matter experts who developed 
the underlying MLST schemes; this will require collabo-
ration and cooperation between public health authori-
ties and academic experts.
Data sharing
Rapid sharing of subtyping data between country or 
regional coordinators has been achieved in PulseNet 
International to-date by the exchange of PFGE data 
files on a members-only Internet-based discussion 
board on an as-needed basis. Typically, this occurs 
Table 2
General requirements for a global allele nomenclature database, May 2017
ID Description
1
Submission of sequence data and any subsequent allele calling can only be done by and for registered users. The nomenclature 
database content on the other hand, including the full set of known unique allele sequences and their identifiers, must be publicly 
accessible.
2 All nomenclature related functionality of the database must be free of charge to end users. Long-term sustainability and portability to other servers must be addressed.
3 The database must have close to 100% guaranteed uptime and have sufficient bandwidth to support upload of data by organisations worldwide. Sufficient computing power must be available to perform quality controls and allele calling in real time.
4
It must be possible to submit either raw reads or individual allele sequences, in order to retrieve the corresponding allele identifiers as 
well as any quality control results. Raw reads or any derived data other than individual new alleles may not be stored permanently in 
the database or used for any other purpose than deriving allele nomenclature. If needed for practical reasons, submission of raw reads 
can be implemented at a later stage.
5 There must be an open interface for machine-to-machine communication that covers all of the publicly available functionality. A formal process to incorporate input and agreement from stakeholders on changes to the system must be in place.
6 It must be possible for authorised curator users to annotate individual allele sequences with information, e.g. to include them as a reference allele, and to add additional loci to derive allele nomenclature for, as the known pan genome grows.
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after a potential outbreak has already been flagged 
by one country/region, with the exception of the US 
and Canada who permit direct access to each other’s 
national databases. National or regional databases 
are accessed directly by internal network members. 
With the limited utility of PFGE data outside of out-
break detection and response, there has not been 
cause to make these data more widely available on a 
routine basis. Also, sharing of real-time PFGE results 
outside the network has historically been strictly con-
trolled, executed according to agreements negotiated 
by coordinating country/regional laboratories and their 
submitters (typically state, provincial, or local labora-
tories) whose individual privacy legislations stipulate 
conditions for sharing. 
However, genome sequences can be used for many 
more purposes than routine public health surveillance 
and outbreak response, in particular they are highly 
suitable for basic research and activities aligned with 
the One Health approach [25]. Ideally, the genome 
sequences collected for surveillance purposes should 
be publicly available, if not in real time then within 
a reasonable time frame, e.g. within 12 months of 
sequence generation. These data should comprise 
both the sequences and some descriptive data about 
the isolate, as the sequences themselves alone have 
extremely limited utility. Publicly available repositories 
within the INSDC accessible via the Internet would be 
the ideal storage location, i.e. the SRA, the European 
Nt Archive and the DNA Data Bank of Japan as these are 
synchronised with each other on a regular basis. Each 
organisation or country/region determines itself which 
sequence data to upload, along with what descriptive 
data (e.g. time, place and type of isolate) would be 
uploaded to these repositories. Current data sharing 
procedures in some PulseNet International participat-
ing laboratories show promise in providing a suitable 
balance between protecting the privacy of patients and 
the utility of data generated and shared in real-time for 
global surveillance; these procedures include provid-
ing very little descriptive data for each isolate initially 
followed by the addition of information about the iso-
late after a 6–12 month delay. 
At present, not all public sequence repositories allow 
for user-defined controls (e.g. sharing WGS data with 
a specific user subset immediately after upload and 
during a period of embargo before public release); 
however, such functionality as well as an improved 
interface may accelerate implementation of WGS and 
data sharing by more organisations. Given the exper-
tise, infrastructure, mission and stability of the public 
repositories, integrating the global allele nomenclature 
databases, the allele-calling algorithms and possibly 
the strain nomenclature databases into these public 
spheres with an appropriate curator interface for sub-
ject matter experts would be desirable at the global 
level. Storing the allele identifiers along with the WGS 
data in the sequence repository would effectively make 
the latter searchable for the presence of loci, specific 
alleles and specific mutations. Since the principle of 
allele nomenclature is species independent, it could 
even be applied to all species rather than only those 
relevant for food- and waterborne diseases, to the ben-
efit of all users of these databases.
Validation
Like other subtyping methods, WGS-based tests must 
be thoroughly validated before implementation in rou-
tine public health practice. For a global network like 
PulseNet International, validation ensures that the 
method is applicable for strains encountered by all 
network members, performance is suitable, and it also 
generates interpretive guidelines necessary for the 
consistent interpretation of WGS results. Methods are 
subject to three phases of validation: internal, external 
(see below for explanation), and post-implementation 
evaluation and refinement. Ideally, all phases should 
be completed before implementation network-wide. 
However, the rapid demonstration of the superior tech-
nical performance of WGS compared with methods pre-
viously accepted as gold standards (e.g. PFGE, MLVA) 
has accelerated its implementation in many laborato-
ries, before the formal completion of validation at the 
international level. Regardless of current individual 
country status, validation is ultimately necessary to 
ensure evidence standards for public health decision 
making can be consistently met.
Internal validation
The purpose of internal validation is to verify the 
robustness and technical performance of the method 
using a well-defined set of isolates. For internal vali-
dation of wg/cgMLST-based approaches, for example, 
this includes an assessment of each locus plus the 
scheme as a whole for reproducibility, stability, dis-
crimination and epidemiological concordance, and a 
comparison with current gold standards.
External validation and post-implementation 
evaluation
During external validation, the portability and inter-
laboratory robustness of the method are tested on a 
common isolate set in a wider number of laboratories. 
Typically this includes geographically dispersed labo-
ratories with different levels of expertise and access to 
a wide variety of equipment and reagents. The external 
validation should also include prospective (or retro-
spective, if necessary) testing of isolate sets collected 
from each laboratory’s routine operations. Once imple-
mented, periodic evaluations are conducted for con-
tinual improvement. This is done to detect problems 
not identified during the initial validation, to assess 
the impact of any proposed changes to laboratory 
equipment and reagents, and to accommodate new 
bioinformatics methods. With the fields of genomics 
and bioinformatics currently experiencing rapid rates 
of advances, international systems such as PulseNet 
should be flexible enough to allow improvements to 
the process while protecting the integrity of inter-labo-
ratory comparability and quality control.
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Quality control
While quality control for individual laboratories is 
important, it is critical for a network wherein the 
results generated by laboratories other than your own 
are relied upon to support local and multi-jurisdic-
tional public health decision making. A rigorous qual-
ity control programme ensures that correct results are 
reliably produced by all participants at all times and 
provides checkpoints during the process to flag and 
remove potentially incorrect results.
Routine quality parameters
Quality of the raw reads must be assessed; if the mini-
mum quality metrics are not met, the reads must be 
discarded and sequencing repeated. All platforms pro-
duce raw reads of both sequences and the individual 
quality scores. A primary quality metric is coverage, 
defined as the number of raw reads for the average 
read length over the genome (i.e. the number of times 
each base in the genome is contained in individual raw 
reads). A minimum coverage of 30x is typically enough 
for routine surveillance, but this is platform-dependent 
and also may vary by organism [21,26]. Other quality 
metrics to be checked routinely include the average 
Phred or Q scores as a measure of base-calling accu-
racy. Low quality reads should not be uploaded to a 
repository or PulseNet database, open or closed to 
the public. Taxonomy check should also be included 
in the basic raw read quality check since isolate mix-
ups and mixed cultures are the most common errors 
encountered in the laboratories generating sequencing 
data. Similarly, routine quality parameters such as the 
proportion of core genome loci detected through allele 
calling should also be implemented for the bioinfor-
matics pipeline(s) used for analysis.
Ensuring standardisation and competence
As basic tenets of quality control, written stand-
ard operating procedures must be in place for both 
sequencing and analysis and the procedures should 
only be performed by trained personnel. Participation 
in an external quality assessment (EQA) programme 
is recommended. While each country/region sets its 
own quality control requirements, many PulseNet 
International participating countries submit and pass 
an organism-specific certification test before they are 
permitted to submit data to a repository or to most 
PulseNet country/regional databases (although this 
is not the case in Europe or PulseNet Asia-Pacific). 
The certification process documents each partici-
pant’s highest level of competence in producing raw 
sequence data, performing analysis using bioinfor-
matics tools, and checking data quality (participants 
may be certified in producing raw sequence data, ana-
lysing the results, or both). Initial PulseNet certifica-
tion is followed by annual proficiency tests to ensure 
that competence is maintained. These quality control 
procedures are largely based on the well-established 
PulseNet International quality control programme for 
molecular subtyping; however, they may be further 
modified as needed to best suit WGS, as part of the 
continual evaluation and refinement process.
Implementation
Global whole genome sequencing 
implementation is not all-or-nothing
The benefits of genome sequencing have driven its use 
for public health decision making despite the lack of 
fully developed systems and infrastructure [27]. Across 
members of PulseNet International, the maturity and 
complexity of internal country/regional laboratory 
surveillance networks, the availability of funding and 
human resources, as well as the relative importance 
of infections caused by unsafe food among all infec-
tious diseases differ across countries, according to 
each country’s own priorities and resources. Thus, 
the strategy and timing for implementation of WGS for 
food-borne disease surveillance will vary around the 
world. At the same time, the costs of WGS are often 
already lower than the currently used characterisa-
tion methods including PFGE and MLVA and will likely 
decrease further [21]. Recently, recommendations 
have been published to guide both developed and 
developing countries in determining their readiness 
for implementing WGS [28]. With readiness depend-
ent on a wide variety of political, technical, economic 
and political factors; e.g. infrastructure, equipment, 
training, operating funds, policies, etc.; each country 
will set their own timeline for implementation. Some 
countries have been able to make rapid transitions to 
WGS (i.e. within 12 months or less), others have had a 
slower pace spanning multiple years. Internationally, a 
gradual transition from traditional molecular methods 
to genome sequencing would ensure that countries 
not able to immediately implement WGS are not sepa-
rated from the rest of the public health community [21]. 
Waiting for universal readiness before moving forward 
is also not advised; this would delay the manifestation 
of WGS benefits to food-borne disease management 
and prevention overall. There is a risk of dividing coun-
tries according to genomics capacity, furthering health 
inequalities due to economic status and hampering 
efforts to reduce disease burden and further efforts 
towards One Health [25].
The role of PulseNet International’s public 
health laboratory network
PulseNet International’s extensive network of labo-
ratories, and history of standardisation and sharing, 
uniquely position it to guide WGS implementation 
worldwide in a manner that minimises isolating indi-
vidual countries or regions. As revolutionary as genom-
ics is for food-borne disease (and virtually all areas of 
infectious disease public health), these challenges of 
international compatibility are not new. These very 
same issues were faced during the implementation of 
PFGE in PulseNet International starting two decades 
ago [2]. Global standardisation was achieved through 
the network’s capacity building and training activities, 
consensus decision making among participants, and a 
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careful balance between scientific merit and practical 
issues, these strengths provide the foundation to build 
a new system based on WGS. The members of PulseNet 
International are almost exclusively focused on the 
needs of routine surveillance for outbreak detection 
and response, which enables advances in genomics 
and bioinformatics to be harnessed and tailored to 
those specific needs while simultaneously advocating 
for the availability of data for broader purposes. The 
sharing of experiences and ‘lessons learned’ is another 
key role of PulseNet International; routine communica-
tion and sharing of protocols, policies, implementation 
plans, etc., across the network enables all members to 
benefit from the experience of early adopters. 
Other national and international initiatives and net-
works lead or contribute substantially to the develop-
ment of genomics and bioinformatics in the area of 
food safety. For example, the GenomeTrakr network 
(US Food and Drug Administration) has pioneered open 
source tools, public data sharing, and the application 
of WGS to regulatory and compliance activities [29]. 
PulseNet International is the public health-focused 
network of laboratories responsible for surveillance 
and outbreak response, which is complementary to 
GenomeTrakr activities. In the European Union, the 
European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control 
and the European Food Safety Authority collaborate 
to collect and analyse molecular typing data in a sin-
gle database, providing centralised surveillance capa-
bility. The Global Microbial Identifier initiative is the 
forerunner for planning global genomics systems for 
all infectious diseases in all sectors of science and 
beyond [7]. The European COMPARE project leverages 
INSDC infrastructure and is working to provide a plat-
form to support WGS data sharing and analysis (http://
www.compare-europe.eu/). Additional organisations 
also play pivotal roles in international food safety, 
including the World Health Organization of the United 
Nations’ INFOSAN and Global Food-borne Infections 
Network, and the Food and Agricultural Organisation 
of the United Nations. These organisations are also 
leaders in capacity building and knowledge transfer 
for WGS and its impacts on food-borne disease surveil-
lance, as well as for regulatory and policy framework 
guidance.
Beyond the laboratory
For the integration of WGS for routine surveillance, all 
public health-related professionals must be prepared 
for the use of genomic data to support public health 
decision making. WGS should not be portrayed as a 
panacea; it does not replace the need for high quality 
epidemiological data to be interpreted in context with 
laboratory results [30]. Knowledge transfer must occur 
not only for the participating public health laborato-
ries, but also for the national and regional epidemi-
ologists and other immediate stakeholders. PulseNet 
member laboratories often serve as the interface 
between food-borne disease laboratory and epidemi-
ology, and between public health and food monitor-
ing. Understanding basic genomics and bioinformatics 
concepts by all members of the food safety continuum 
is needed.
Conclusion
To meet the needs of real-time surveillance, PulseNet 
International will standardise WGS-based subtyping 
using extended MLST-based approaches; specifically, 
wgMLST. This delivers optimal resolution and epide-
miological concordance while providing unambiguous 
nomenclature. In addition, it is computationally effi-
cient and realistic for most public health laboratories 
to use on a daily basis. Standardised protocols, vali-
dation studies, quality control programmes, database 
and scheme development, and training materials all 
must support the implementation and decentralisation 
of any new technique. As was done previously with 
PFGE, PulseNet International is presently disseminating 
these important elements among network members. 
Training, in particular, is a keystone for the success of 
standardised PulseNet activities; this will require dedi-
cated and sustainable resources. A recent economic 
evaluation of PulseNet activities suggests that in the 
US alone, PulseNet prevents at least 270,000 illnesses 
from S. enterica, E. coli, and L. monocytogenes and 
saves 500 million US dollars (447 million euros) every 
year in medical costs and lost productivity [31]. The 
economic return on investment in PulseNet is approxi-
mately 70 US dollars/euros of benefit for every 1 dollar/
euro invested by public health agencies. This demon-
strates a significant economic and public health bene-
fit from the system, and these impacts are expected to 
be even greater with the superior performance of WGS.
In order to truly standardise food-borne disease sub-
typing across the world, a public WGS-based nomen-
clature, curated where necessary, must be available 
as WGS data are not only suitable for surveillance 
and outbreak purposes, but also for answering other 
scientific questions (e.g. source attribution, antimi-
crobial resistance, transmission patterns, population 
structure, etc.). The WGS data themselves (including a 
minimum set of descriptive data) should ideally also be 
publicly available. To fully realise this vision, technical 
and political challenges must be overcome. PulseNet 
International will leverage its experience to guide the 
implementation of genome sequencing in a manner 
that both meets immediate public health needs and 
supports broader efforts to preventing and mitigating 
the effects of food-borne disease worldwide.
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